#### It is this displacement of our personal ethical commitments that allows for genocidal violence to take place. The allowance of political institutions to determine what is and is not ethical action or is the root of all atrocities

Zupancic Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan, March 2000, p. 96-7

“Another problem still remains, however: the question of the possibility of (performing) an ethical act. Is it at all possible for a human subject to accomplish an (ethical) act - or, more precisely, is it possible that something like an Act actually occurs in (empirical) reality? Or does it exists only in a series of failures which only some supreme Being can see as a whole, as an Act? If we are to break. out of the `logic of fantasy', framed by the postulates of immortality and God (the point of view of the Supreme Being), we have to assert that Acts do in fact occur in reality. In other words, we have to `attack' Kant on his exclusion of the `highest good' and the `highest (or diabolical) evil' as impossible for human agents. But does this not mean that we thereby give in to another fantasy, and simply substitute one fantasy for another? Would this kind of claim not imply that we have to `phenomenalize' the Law, abolish the internal division or alienation of human will, and assert the existence of devilish and/or angelic beings? This point was in fact made by Joan Copjec,16 who defends Kant against critics who reproach him for - as she puts it - `lack of intellectual nerve,' for not having enough courage to admit the possibility of diabolical evil. The attempt to think diabolical evil (as a real possibility) turns out, according to this argument, to be another attempt to deny the will's self-alienation, and to make of the will a pure, positive force. This amounts to a voluntarist reading of Kant's philosophy, combined with the romantic notion of the possibility of a refusal of the Law. We do not contest the validity of this argument per se. But the problem is that it leaves us with an image of Kantian ethics which is not very far from what we might call an `ethics of tragic resignation': a man is only a man; he is finite, divided in himself - and therein lies his uniqueness, his tragic glory. A man is not God, and he should not try to act like God, because if he does, he will inevitably cause evil. The problem with this stance is that it fails to recognize the real source of evil (in the common sense of the word). Let us take the example which is most frequently used, the Holocaust: what made it possible for the Nazis to torture and kill millions of Jews was not simply that they thought they were gods, and could therefore decide who would live and who would die, but the fact that they saw themselves as instruments of God (or some other Idea), who had already decided who could live and who must die. Indeed, what is most dangerous is not an insignificant bureaucrat who thinks he is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant bureaucrat. One could even say that, for the subject, the most difficult thing is to accept that, in a certain sense, she is `God', that she has a choice. Hence the right answer to the religious promise of immortality is not the pathos of the finite; the basis of ethics cannot be an imperative which commands us to endorse our finitude and renounce our `higher', `impossible' aspirations but, rather, an imperative which invites us to recognize as our own the `infinite' which can occur as something that is `essentially a by-product' of our actions.

#### Turns the AFF – The use of the law as the vehicle for ethical change and social activism is counter-productive. It mandates authoritarianism and violence and is independently unethical because it sacrifices relationships in the name of political expediency

Dennis Fox (Emeritus Associate Professor, Legal Studies University of Illinois at Springfield) 1991 “Law Against Social Change” http://www.dennisfox.net/papers/law-against.html

Well-meaning efforts by liberal psychologists to reform the law in keeping with values such as dignity, privacy, justice, and equality are often misguided because law exists to serve the status quo. Law inhibits the systemic, radical social change necessary for psychological and societal well-being. It does so through coercive power, substantive assumptions about human nature, the ideology of law's legitimacy, a preoccupation with procedure rather than substance, a focus on rational technicality rather than equity, and encouragement for limited, self-defeating legal solutions. Psycholegal scholars should arouse public dissatisfaction with law and assist social movements seeking to overcome legal impediments to social change. Summary [This is a summary of part of the paper that I prepared for a class.] Psychologists often advocate legal reform because they believe that psychology and law have similar values and, consequently, that the two can be partners in efforts to improve society. Not all of us, however, are comfortable with such close ties to the status quo. A large literature within psychology presents an alternative view: that we should instead break our mainstream bonds and seek radical social change in order to create a humane, egalitarian, just society. Since I share this alternative view, I evaluate the law differently from my liberal peers. Instead of compatibility between law and psychology, I see conflict. Instead of minor reform as reasonable, I see it too often as a hindrance to social transformation. And instead of law being a useful tool, I see it as an inevitable weapon against radical activism. Law, in short, is an an opponent rather than an ally of those seeking fundamental change. Much psycholegal work is already relevant to the maintenance function of law. What is needed is a reexamination of this function from the perspective of an outsider rather than an insider. In my limited time today, I want to comment on six related ways that law prevents social change. 1. Heavy Handed Use of Coercive Power The first way that law presents social change is obvious: Coercion. As Lawrence Friedman put it, Law has its hidden persuaders--its moral basis, its legitimacy--but in the last analysis it has force, too, to back it up. Law carries a powerful stick: the threat of force. This is the fist inside its velvet glove. Law is used directly and indirectly to hinder both legal and illegal social change efforts. Electoral challenges, for example, are deflected by state legislatures, which devise unreasonable deadlines, excessive petition requirements, and other hassles to keep third parties off the ballot. As an old anarchist slogan put it, if voting could change the system, it would be illegal. Activists fare little better in court. Given litigation delays, costs, procedural pitfalls, and judges' backgrounds, radicals are rarely successful. The doctrines of standing, governmental immunity, and political questions, the substance of conservative legal principles, and the likelihood of reversal upon appeal limit how much even a sympathetic judge can allow activists to win. Since law is created by the powerful rather than the weak, dissident concerns are often simply dismissed as frivolous. When activists demonstrate peacefully, they often find the law against them. Although it is no longer legitimate to arrest those who advocate change, the benign view of our "First Amendment freedoms" has a fairly short history, and has never been as absolute as many think. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, and remembering the recent treatment given flag burners, any confidence that the public supports truly free speech is unwarranted. Surveillance, infliltration, and repression of legal activist groups continue. Harassment of activists doesn't come just from government. Corporations often file libel and other lawsuits against people who use letters to newspapers, public statements, and similar methods to criticize corporate projects such as toxic waste dumps. More than 1000 of these "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation" have been filed within the past decade. Although most of these suits are legally "unsuccessful" in that free speech rights are upheld and the activist pays no damages, the suits serve their purposes of transforming political debates into private disputes and, more significantly, tieing up activist's time and resources, bankrupting the activist, often causing the abandonment of public advocacy. When activists move on to direct action and civil disobedience, law's coercive force is clearest. Police infiltration and instigation of violent activities, selective prosecution, and preventive detention add to the likelihood of guilty verdicts and disproportionate sentences. Judges usually prevent defendants from presenting a necessity defense based on their motivations for breaking the law. When the jury is told the incident is a "simple trespassing case," for example, rather than a political act, the primary concern of the activist is dismissed as irrelevant.

### link

#### Reclaiming the ability to ethically relate to individuals is a necessary pre-cursor to changing the negative conditions cited in the 1AC

Peter Hershock (East-West Center) 1999 “Changing the way society changes”, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 6, 154

I have argued at some length (Hershock, 1999) that evaluating technologies on the basis of the tools they generate commits us to taking individual users and not the dramatic patterns of our lived interdependence as the primary locus of evaluation. In doing so, we effectively exclude from consideration precisely that domain in which the values informing our technological bias have the most direct bearing on the quality of our personal and communal conduct -- the movement of our shared narration. This has led to a stubborn and at times even righteous blindness regarding our slippage into a new era of colonization -- a colonization, not of lands or cultural spheres, but of consciousness as such. Indeed, the disposition to ignore the critical space of interdependence has been so thoroughly prevalent that the conditions of possibility for this new form of colonialism are widely championed -- in both the "developed" and the "developing" world -- as essential to establishing and safeguarding our individual and collective dignity, a crucial component of our growing equality and autonomy. By using the same information technologies employed by those individuals and institutions perpetrating and perpetuating the inequitable distribution of power and wealth, social activists may have enjoyed the opportunity to "beat them at their own game." However, they have also insured that everyone remains on the same playing field, playing the same game. Social activist successes have in this way blinded us to our deepening submission to technologies of control and the consequent depletion of precisely those attentive resources needed to meaningfully accord with our changing circumstances and contribute to them as needed. The costs of such blindness are practically limitless. The more "successful" a technology is, the more indispensable it becomes. That is, all technologies are liable to crossing thresholds beyond which they generate more new problems than they solve. Because technologies arise as patterns of value-driven conduct, they function as ambient amplifiers of our individual and cultural karma -- our experience-conditioning, intentional activity. In crossing the threshold of their utility, technologies create the karmic equivalent of a gravitational black hole, funneling all available attention-energy into themselves. For the dominant technological lineage correlated with the rise of liberal democracy and the imperative for social activism, this has meant an intensification of our karma for both controlling and being controlled. The more successfully we extend the limits of control, the more we extend the range of what can and must be controlled. In capsule form: the better we get at getting what we want, the better we get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting, the better we get at getting what we want, though we won't want what we get. This karmic circularity is pernicious, and the attention-energy invested in it to date has already brought about an epidemic depletion of precisely those resources needed for realizing dramatically satisfying -- and not merely factually sufficient -- solutions to our troubles, both personal and communal. The methodological irony of social activism is that it does not free us from dependence, but rather sustains its very possibility. This is not as paradoxical as it might sound. Insuring our independence by means of restructuring the institutions that mediate our contact with one another renders us dependent on those institutions -- on the structure, and hence the technologies, of our mediation. In consequence, our freedom comes to be increasingly dependent on the rationalization and regulation of our relationships with one another -- the realization of secure and yet generic co-existence. Just as the technology-driven transformation of societies in the industrial and post-industrial eras has involved an ever more detailed refinement of class divisions and labor categories, social activism advances through an ever more varied identification of populations in need of guaranteed freedoms. In valorizing both autonomy and equality, social activism denies our dramatic interdependence and tacitly endorses not-seeing (avidyĀ) or not-attending to the full set of conditions sponsoring our present situation. Although unique and deeply local patterns of injustice may be important in building a legal case, the work of social activism is not to encourage our liberating intimacy with such patterns. Rather, it consists of constructing legal mechanisms for exerting reformative control over institutional structures and the processes by means of which (generically) given individuals play or are forced to play particular roles therein. Unfortunately, as generic 'women', 'children', 'workers', or 'minorities', the beneficiaries of social activism are effectively cut off from precisely those aspects of their circumstances, relationships, and self-understanding which provide them with the resources necessary for locally realizing meaningful -- and not merely factual -- alternatives to the patterns of injustice in which they find themselves embedded. Among the products of social activism are thus virtual communities

of individuals having no immediate and dramatically responsive relationship with one another -- individuals who have relinquished or been deprived of intimate connection with the causes and conditions of both their troubles and those troubles' meaningful resolution. With no intended disregard of the passion many activists bring to their work, social activism has aimed at globally re-engineering our political, economic and societal environments in much the same way that our dominant technological lineage has been committed to re-making our world -- progressively

"humanizing" and "rationalizing" the abundantly capricious natural circumstances into which we human beings have found ourselves "thrown." This shared strategic genealogy is particularly disturbing, suggesting that -- like all technologies oriented toward control -- social activism is liable to rendering itself indispensable. If the history of social activism is inseparable from the rise and spread of influential technologies and subject to similar accelerating and retarding conditions, so is its future. Social Activist Strategy: Legally Leveraging Institutional Change While it has become common practice to decry the excessive legalism of contemporary societies, the ramifications of strategic collusion between social activism and the way we have technically and legally tooled our factual co-existence have remained largely unattended. In part, this is because the legal bias of social activism has appeared so incontestably "practical." Legislation allows for directly restructuring power relations and negotiating justice at the "highest" possible levels. The legislative process has also become the dominant technology for mediating divergent claims about the facts of our (often troubled) co-existence and for preserving "fair" definitions of 'being right' and 'being wronged'.

## Alt Solves

#### Demands on the state reinforce state power – only the alternative of individual action solves

Brian Martin 1990 “uprooting war” http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html

The obvious point is that most social activists look constantly to the state for solutions to social problems. This point bears labouring, because the orientation of most social action groups tends to reinforce state power. This applies to most antiwar action too. Many of the goals and methods of peace movements have been oriented around action by the state, such as appealing to state elites and advocating neutralism and unilateralism. Indeed, peace movements spend a lot of effort debating which demand to make on the state: nuclear freeze, unilateral or multilateral disarmament, nuclear-free zones, or removal of military bases. By appealing to the state, activists indirectly strengthen the roots of many social problems, the problem of war in particular. To help transform the state system, action groups need to develop strategies which, at a minimum, do not reinforce state power. This means ending the incessant appeals for state intervention, and promoting solutions to social problems which strengthen local self-reliance and initiative. What can be done about poverty? Promote worker and community control over economic resources, and local self-reliance in skills and resources. What about racial discrimination? Promote discussion, interaction and nonviolent action at a grassroots level. What about environmental degradation? Encourage local communities to re-examine their own activities and to confront damaging practices. What about sexual discrimination? Build grassroots campaigns against rape and the gender division of labour, and mount challenges to hierarchical structures which help sustain patriarchy. What about corporate irresponsibility or excess profits? Promote worker and community control over production. What about unemployment? Promote community control of community resources for equitable distribution of work and the economic product, and develop worker cooperatives as an alternative to jobs as gifts of employers. What about crime? Work against unequal power and privilege, and for meaningful ways of living, to undercut the motivation for crime, and promote local community solidarity as a defence against crime. What about enemy attack? Social defence. What about too much military spending? Build local alternatives to the state, use these alternatives to withdraw support from the state and undermine the economic foundation of military spending. These grassroots, self-managing solutions to social problems are in many cases no more than suggestive directions. Detailed grassroots strategies in most cases have not been developed, partly because so little attention has been devoted to them compared to strategies relying on state intervention. But the direction should be clear: in developing strategies to address social problems, aim at building local self-reliance and withdrawing support from the state rather than appealing for state intervention and thereby reinforcing state power. Many people's thinking is permeated by state perspectives. One manifestation of this is the unstated identification of states or governments with the people in a country which is embodied in the words 'we' or 'us.' "We must negotiate sound disarmament treaties." "We must renounce first use of nuclear weapons." Those who make such statements implicitly identify with the state or government in question. It is important to avoid this identification, and to carefully distinguish states from people. The Italian state is different from the people living in Italy. Instead of saying "China invaded Vietnam," it is more accurate and revealing to say something like "Chinese military forces invaded Vietnamese territory" or perhaps "Chinese military forces, mostly conscripts, were ordered by the rulers of the Chinese state to invade territory which was claimed by rulers of the Vietnamese state as exclusively theirs to control." Also to be avoided is the attribution of gender to states, as in 'motherland' or 'fatherland.'Many social action campaigns have a national focus, a national organisational basis and depend on national activist leaders. This is especially true when the campaign is based on influencing state elites to implement or change policies. This national orientation both reflects and reinforces a state perspective and state power. The alternative is to think and act both locally and transnationally, and to develop skills and leadership at local levels. This approach has been adopted by some social movements, but seldom on a sustained and systematic basis.

#### \*\*\*Jayan Nayar 1999 (professor of law at the university of warwick) “orders of inhumanity” fall, p. lexis

we are today bombarded by images of our "one world." we speak of the world as "shrinking" into a "global village." we are not all fooled by the implicit benign-ness of this image of "time-space" contracted--so we also speak of "global pillage." this astuteness of our perceptions, however, does not prevent us from our delusion of the "global;" the image of the "global" world persists even for many activists amongst us who struggle to "change" the world. this is recent delusion. it is a delusion which anesthetizes us from the only world which we can ever locate ourselves in and know--the worlds of "I"-in relationships. the "I" is seldom present in "emancipatory" projects to change the world. this is because the "relational i"-world and the "global"-world are negations of one another; the former negates the concept of the latter whilst the latter negates the life of the former. and concepts are more amenable to scrutiny than life. the advance in technologies of image-ing enables a distanciation of scrutiny, from the "i"-world of relationships to the "global"-world of abstractions. as we become fixated with the distant, as we consume the images of "world" as other than here and now, as we project ourselves through technological time-space into worlds apart from our here and now, as we become "global," we are relieved of the gravity of our present. we, thus, cease the activism of self (being) and take on the mantle of the "activist" (doing). this is a significant displacement. that there is suffering all over the world has indeed been made more visible by the technologies of image-ing. yet for all its consequent fostering of "networks," images of "global" suffering have also served to disempower. by this, we mean not merely that we are filled with the sense that the forces against which the struggle for emancipations from injustice and exploitation are waged are pervasive and, therefore, often impenetrable, but, more importantly, that it diverts our gaze away from the only true power that is in our disposal--the power of self-change in relationships of solidarities. the "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. it does not exist today. there is no such thing as the global "one world." the world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. it is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out there, [\*630] it only exists in relationship. to say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. there can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence. changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed. and the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. and the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "i" of all of us. and so, to change our relationships, we must change the "i" that is each of us. transformations of "structures" will soon follow. this is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. this is, perhaps, the essential message of mahatmas.

### Case

#### Total rejection of security discourse causes war.

Charles F. Doran is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 139—52

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per Se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz’s most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.